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This thesis project addresses Islamic water management by presenting case 
studies on regional water issues and analyzing the extent to which Muslim-majority states 
behave in a way consistent with Islamic shariah law.  The case studies presented in this 
thesis address both international cooperation related to the management of trans-
boundary water basins (the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates River Basins) and domestic water 
management strategies employed by Muslim-majority states in the MENA region (Jordan 
and Yemen).  In each case, it is not clear that there is consistency between the Islamic 
ideals discussed by academics and the actual techniques employed by various states.  In 
international attempts at managing the shared waters of the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates 
Basins, the fact that many riparian states have Muslim-majority populations does not 
 v 
appear to make the management of trans-boundary resources any easier or more 
successful.  The implications for Islamic water management at the domestic level is also 
unclear – with shariah playing a positive role in Jordanian attempts at water conservation 
but promoting the over-exploitation of resources in Yemen.  Although shariah appears to 
play a limited role in the management of trans-boundary water resources, it seems to be 
better suited for informing how states internally manage their endowments of freshwater 
resources. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Situated in what the World Bank terms the world’s most water scarce region, 
states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region face major obstacles in 
effectively managing their water resources.1  When renewable water resources are 
apportioned on a per capita basis, residents of the region have access to an average of 
approximately 1,100 cubic meters of water per person per year (m3/p/y), much less than 
the global average of 8,900 m3.2  The region’s water is expected to become increasingly 
scarce due to high population growth rates.  By 2050, it is estimated that per capita water 
availability will decrease by 50 percent, a figure which does not account for the potential 
effects of climate change on regional weather patterns during the same period.3  Given 
this situation, there is a need to devise and implement water management techniques that 
will enable MENA states to conserve and protect their freshwater resources.  Although 
scholars have identified a number of water management techniques that are applicable 
worldwide, evidence suggests that the forces of culture and religion have a considerable 
effect on how societies manage a resource like water.4  Given the region’s Muslim 
majority population and the extent to which Islam affects the daily life of most of the 
region’s inhabitants, the relationship between Islam and the management of water 
resources must be addressed. 
Although scholars and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the 
water sector have begun to address the role that Islam plays in water management, the 
existing literature on the subject is limited and does not address conditions in specific 
                                                
1 World Bank, Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Washington: The World Bank (2007), xiii. 
2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, AQUASTAT, online database, at http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/ 
3 World Bank, xiii. 
4 Nassser Faruqi, “Introduction,” Water Management in Islam, Water Management in Islam, Faruqui, Biswas, and Bino Eds. (New 
York: United Nations University Press, 2001), xii. 
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states.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the bulk of the literature that exists on water resource 
management neglects to account for the role that Islam or other religions play.  In the few 
works that do exists most academics (i.e., Abdel Haleem, Hamed, etc.) attempt to show 
how the tenants of water management are consistent with the calls for the responsible 
stewardship of environmental resources in Islamic sources like the Quran and hadith.  
This interpretation of the role played by Islam in water management may not provide the 
nuance needed for regional governments to effectively manage their water resources.  
While relevant, these works tend to treat Islam as a mere value system and convey little 
about how the religion is actually used to address water scarcity in the Muslim-majority 
states and the extent to which Islamic principles can be leveraged to improve water 
management regimes in the region. 
To address these shortcomings, this thesis spans the divide between the theoretical 
role of the religion in promoting the responsible use of water resources and the extent to 
which these principles are put into action in daily life.   In addition to providing an 
overview of the existing literature on Islamic water management, I present four case 
studies that highlight the interaction between Islamic legal frameworks and the 
management of freshwater resources.  To illustrate the challenges posed by applying 
Islamic legal principles to the management on trans-boundary surface water basins, one 
section of this document addresses current disputes over water resources in the Nile and 
Tigris-Euphrates river basins.  The remaining section address the management of water 
resources within Muslim-majority states in the Middle East by presenting two case 
studies.  One case documents how Islamic law has been used to determine ownership of 
groundwater resources in Yemen by providing a de facto legal justification for the rule of 
capture and enabling an unprecedented expansion of groundwater extraction.  The final 
case study addresses water resources within the Jordan, specifically how religious 
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principles have been used to legitimize the government’s attempts to promote water 
conservation. 
Although shariah law has not been utilized extensively by Muslim-majority states 
in attempts to manage trans-boundary water resources like the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates 
River Basins, this is likely representative of the fact that there exists few international 
legal mechanisms for resolving disputes over such resources.  While Muslim-majority 
states do not appear to be more likely to manage trans-boundary resources effectively, 
further study of the interplay between shariah and secular law may be beneficial in 
identifying regional mechanisms for enhancing cooperation among riparian states.  
Islamic law appears to play a larger role in a state’s domestic management of water 
resources.  In contrasting water management policies in Yemen and Jordan, it is apparent 
that shariah has the potential to result in both positive and negative impacts on a 
country’s water supply.  Further study is needed to determine the precise impact that 
shariah will have on the water supply in a given state.
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
Over the past several decades, a vast body of literature has developed to address 
the topic of water management.  At least some of these works make an implicit 
assumption that the findings they present have universal applicability despite the 
numerous social, cultural, and political differences that may differentiate one water 
management challenge from another.  Due to this project’s specific focus on the 
management of water resources in the MENA region, there is a need to analyze Islam’s 
treatment of water resources and the extent to which widely accepted water management 
techniques can be implemented in Muslim-majority states.  Although the available 
literature in this area is limited, there has been an increasing focus on this topic in recent 
years, reflecting in part the water scarcity that exists in many of these states.   
This chapter provides an overview of the existing academic literature on the 
subject of Islamic water management.  Focus areas include: the treatment of water in 
Islamic sources; Islamic shariah law pertaining to water management; and the potential 
role of Islam in the effective management of water resources. 
 
THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON WATER 
Much of the published material available on the subject of Islamic water 
management relates to the theoretical consistencies that exist between the Islamic faith 
and the dutiful stewardship of natural resources, including freshwater.  Many of these 
works discuss the importance of water in Islamic texts and highlight calls for the 
equitable distribution of resources and the need to conserve and protect these resources.  
These references to humankind’s relationship with water are central to discussions about 
Islamic water management because they represent widely held cultural views about 
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humankind’s relationship with water in many Muslim-majority states and form the basis 
for shariah law’s treatment of water issues.  An understanding of these principles 
beneficial for gaining insights into current water practices and determining how water 
management can be adapted to an Islamic context. 
Given the desert environment in which the Islamic faith emerged, it is perhaps not 
surprising that water features prominently in many of the religion’s key teachings, 
including those contained in the Quran and the hadith (the documented sayings and 
actions of the Prophet Muhammad).  In one oft-cited verse, the Quran highlights the 
importance of water by noting that, “We made from water everything living.”5  The word 
“water” appears over 60 times in the Quran, with numerous references to other water-
related words like “rivers,” “the sea,” “fountains,” “springs,” and “rain.”6  The Quran 
describes water as a gift from God that is used so that, “We may give life to a dead land, 
and give it for drink to cattle and many people that We have created.”7  In addition to its 
obvious utility for preserving life, water has particular significance in Islam due to the 
faith’s emphasis on cleanliness and water’s centrality to the purification rituals that must 
be performed by Muslims prior to praying. 
Due to its importance, Islamic sources call for the equitable division of water 
resources and, to achieve this goal, establish common ownership of natural resources like 
water.  The necessity of an equitable division of water is made apparent in the Quranic 
verse, “And inform them that the water is shard between them; every share of water shall 
be attended.”8  A number of hadith provide additional insight by noting that God 
withholds his favor from individuals who deny others the use of water when they have a 
                                                
5 Holy Quran, Trans. Maulana Muhammad Ali, (Dublin, OH: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at Islam Lahore Inc., 2002), 652. 
6 Muhammad Abdel Haleem, “Water in the Quran,” Islamic Quarterly 33, 1 (1989): 34. 
7 Holy Quran, 724. 
8 Ibid., 1039. 
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surplus.9  These statements regarding the sharing of water are consistent with the 
religion’s emphasis on charity and the equitable distribution of wealth in society.  As 
Faruqui notes, “virtually all of the hadith relate to the preservation of equity, and those 
related to water are no exception.”10  One of the mechanisms used to ensure that water is 
not monopolized is its status as a resource owned by the public.  Public ownership of 
water is justified by the Prophet Muhammad’s declaration that, “Muslims have a 
common share in three (things):  grass, water, and fire.”11  As Hamed notes, “Muhammad 
dealt with monopoly or ‘imperfect competition’ by ruling that indispensible resources 
such as pasture, woodlands, wildlife, certain minerals, and especially water, cannot be 
privately owned in their natural state.”12 
In addition to these general principles relating to water resources, the Quran and 
hadith provide clear instruction on the need for mankind to protect water and other 
natural resources from overuse and pollution.  Although Islam grants humankind the 
ability to exploit natural resources, there is an expectation that this will be done in a way 
that does not damage the environment – consistent with the Quranic verse, “make not 
mischief in the land.”13  The mechanism for ensuring the protection of the environment is 
that of khalifah or steward of the earth’s resources.  The concept of kahlifah is grounded 
in Islamic philosophy and based on the notion that man, because of his status as God’s 
most favored creation, is entrusted with the task of preserving the Earth’s resources.  This 
notion is supported by the Quran’s assertion that, “We made you rulers in the land after 
                                                
9 Abdel Haleem, 47. 
10 Nassser Faruqi, “Islam and Water Management: Overview and Principles,” Water Management in Islam, Faruqui, Biswas, and 
Bino Eds. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), 2. 
11 Qtd. in Dante Augusto Caponera, “Ownership and Transfer of Water and Land in Islam,” Water Management in Islam, Faruqui, 
Biswas, and Bino Eds. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), 95. 
12 Safei El-Deen Hamed, “Seeing the Environment Through Islamic Eyes: Application of Shariah to Natural Resources Planning and 
Management,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 6, 2 (1993): 154. 
13 Holy Quran, 11. 
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them, so that We might see how you act.”14  Khalid argues that the concept of khalifah 
does not render man masters of the natural world, but rather friends and guardians.15   
The concept of khalifah, which establishes a system of environmental ethics, is 
reinforced by specific commandments to avoid the over-exploitation of water resources.  
For example, in one hadith the Prophet Mohammed limited the amount of water that 
could be used in crop irrigation to an ankle’s depth.16  This stipulation, which effectively 
limits water use in irrigation to the amount necessary to provide adequate soil moisture 
for the growing season, sets a clear precedent that prohibits negative appropriation and 
speculation over water resources.17  Hadith like the one presented above are useful in 
promoting sound environmental practices like water conservation.  Such hadith establish 
general requirements that Muslims protect the environment more concrete by providing 
specific examples of acceptable behavior. 
This general framework for humankind’s relationship with water is particularly 
powerful because it is rooted in the religion itself.  Islam is more than a set of principles 
that adherents must strive towards.  Principles inspired by Islam become expectations that 
observant Muslims are obliged to obey.  According to Abdel Haleem, “In Islam 
refraining from monopolizing water, wasting or polluting it is not merely a matter of 
being wise, civilized or showing good conduct as a citizen – it is, above that, an act of 
worship.”18  Amery takes this argument one step further and notes that the system of 
rewards and penalties associated with the faith creates incentives for Muslims to utilize 
                                                
14Holy Quran, 435. 
15 Fazlun Khalid, “Guardians of the Natural Order,” Our Planet 8, 2 (1996): n.p. 
16 John C. Wilkinson, “Muslim Land and Water Law,” Journal of Islamic Studies 1 (1990): 61. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Abdel Haleem, 49. 
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natural resources in a manner consistent with the principles outlined in the Quran and 
hadith.19   
 
ISLAMIC LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT 
The principles presented in the previous section have been interpreted by Islamic 
legal scholars to develop a system of laws governing the use of water resources in Islamic 
states.  Since shariah law must be consistent with Islamic sources like those discussed 
above, it acts as a mechanism for translating general Islamic principles on water use into 
reality.  Sharia continues to play an important role in the water sector of many states in 
the MENA, even those that have adopted Western legal systems as a result of 
colonialism.  The supremacy of shariah is most obvious in theocracies like Saudi Arabia 
and Iran.  However, nearly all other states in the region profess to have a legal system 
consistent with Islamic jurisprudence because of their religious identity.  This is true even 
in the comparably more secular states of Jordan and Egypt.  Islam, therefore, affects 
directly how water is treated in these countries.  In addition to Islamic laws that deal 
explicitly with water, shariah indirectly impacts the management of water through its 
treatment of other issues like land law. 
Despite Caponera’s contention that the water sector in present day Saudi Arabia 
was essentially unregulated and the introduction of Islam resulted in the implementation 
of the area’s first water laws,20 there is some evidence that various techniques were 
employed for water management during the pre-Islamic period.  One must only to look to 
the Code of Hammurabi’s numerous references to water to recognize this early emphasis 
                                                
19 Hussein A. Amery, “Islamic Water Management.” Water International 26, 4 (2001): 481. 
20 Dante Augusto Caponera, Water Laws in Moslem Countries (Rome: Water Resources and Development Service, Land and Water 
Development Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1954), 14. 
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on water management in Babylon.21  Given the lack of historical records from this period, 
however, it is difficult to account for the range of water management techniques 
employed during the period.  Nevertheless, it is apparent that practices like those related 
the falaj system in present-day Oman had origins in the pre-Islamic period.  According to 
Nash, the system’s development is predicated on pre-Islamic practices of star gazing that 
form the basis for calculating the optimal time for planning crops.22  Similarly, the 
ancient Egyptians utilized Nilometers to measure the Nile’s annual floods.  While the 
narrow focus of this project prevents a comprehensive treatment of the connection 
between pre-Islamic and Islamic water management techniques, it seems likely that the 
Islamic techniques discussed in this thesis are at least partially based on some pre-Islamic 
practices. 
Historically, shariah has played an important role in determining how water 
resources are treated in the Muslim World.  The various sects of Islam have created a 
complex system of legal customs regulating the use and ownership of water resources.23  
Rather than being a static system of laws, shariah’s interpretation of different issues 
varies over time and by religious sect; this is also true of Islamic law’s treatment of water 
issues.  As Caponera notes, “Scholars of the two major branches of Islam, the Sunnites 
and Shi’ites, by interpreting the inner meaning of the Prophet Muhammad’s prophecies, 
sought to adapt the principles to local exigencies arising from more complex 
situations.”24 In addition to the variations that exist between Sunni and Shi’a laws, the 
various schools of religious thought within these branches interpret water law differently.  
                                                
21 King of Babylonia Hammurabi, The code of Hammurabi, king of Babylon, about 2250 B.C. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1904). 
22 Harriet Nash, Water Management: the use of stars in Oman, (Ph.D Thesis:  University of Exeter, 2008), 3. 
23 M. E. Norvelle, Water use and ownership according to the text of Hanbali Fiqh, M.A. Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 
Canada, 1974, n.p. 
24 Caponera, “Ownership and Transfer of Water and Land in Islam,” 95. 
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For example, within Sunni Islam, the Maliki and Shafi’i schools of jurisprudence allow 
for the sale of water supplies whereas the Hanifi and Hanbali schools of Sunni Islam 
generally only allow for the sale of water in receptacles.25  Little information is available 
about the diversity of thought that exists on this subject within Shia’ Islam. 
 
Table 1: Sale of Water by Sunni School of Thought 
 Sale of water supplies 
School Unlimited Limited 
Maliki X  
Shafi’i X  
Hanifi  X 
Hanbali  X 
 
In more recent history, laws governing water resources in the Middle East have 
been codified and/or harmonized with Western legal systems.  In the Ottoman Empire, 
Islamic law – including those laws dealing with water resources – were codified in the 
Ottoman Majalla and the Ottoman land laws of 1858.26  The laws contained in the 
Majalla continue to influence water law in modern-day Israel, the Palestinian Authority, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.27  Following the collapse of the Ottoman State, 
colonialism continued the trend towards the codification of traditional laws based in 
shariah and also resulted in the importation of Western legal frameworks.  This process 
                                                
25 Ibid., 98.  
26 Chibli Mallat, “The Quest for Water Use Principles: Reflections on Shari’a and Custom in the Middle East,” Water in the Middle 
East: Legal, Political, and Commercial Implications, Allan and Mallat Eds. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 130. 
27 Ibid. 
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of creating modern legal codes based on traditional law has been a protracted process, 
particularly attempts to reform land law.28  Despite the adoption of many European laws 
through the process of colonial rule, it should be noted that this did not necessarily 
undermine the extent to which water laws were compatible with shariah.  For example, 
under both Islamic and Western legal systems, water retained its status as a state-owned 
resource in most cases.29   
While shariah expressly addresses water issues in many situations, it is important 
to note that Islamic jurisprudence has both direct and indirect influence on water 
resources.  Given the scarcity of water in the MENA region, it should come as no surprise 
that Islamic legal scholars often issued explicit guidance on how adherents to the religion 
should utilize water.  A good example of this is the jurisprudence which establishes the 
right to thirst or haq al-shafaa.  Under this principle, all Muslims are bound by duty to 
offer any excess water they posses to sustain the life of other humans and animals.  
Although Sunnis and Shiites vary in how they reconcile the right to thirst with private 
ownership of water, the principle is largely consistent across the faith.30  This concept has 
been further developed by Muslim jurists like Hanbali to set priorities as to how water is 
used throughout Muslim societies.31  As Mallat notes, the right to thirst prioritizes the use 
of water resources to satisfy human and animal needs above agricultural use.32  This 
prioritization creates a precedent for limiting the amount of water that can be utilized in 
other sectors of the economy during times of scarcity.33 
                                                
28 Farhat J. Ziadeh, “Property Rights in the Middle East: From Traditional Law to Modern Codes,” Arab Law Quarterly 8, 1 (1993), 
12. 
29 Mallat, “Quest for Water Use Principles,” 131. 
30 Caponera, “Ownership and Transfer of Water and Land in Islam,” 96. 
31 M. E. Norvelle, Water use and ownership according to the text of Hanbali Fiqh (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 
Canada, 1974), 1. 
32 Mallat, “Quest for Water Use Principles,” 131129. 
33 Nassser Faruqi, “Intersectoral water markets in the Middle East and North Africa,” Water Management in Islam.  Faruqui, Biswas, 
and Bino Eds. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), 118. 
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Details relating to the ownership of water are also addressed by shariah.  As  
Islam considers water to be a public resource, there exist uncertainties about the 
circumstances under which water can be owned, bought, and sold.  Although the Prophet 
Muhammad discouraged the sale of water, he did condone the sale of water sources like 
wells.  Most Muslim scholars agree that the act of capturing the resource – whether by 
filling containers or by digging a well or irrigation canal – creates the ability for water 
and other public commodities to be sold and traded.34  Furthermore, Islamic water law 
varies based on whether the resource in question is considered a private good, a restricted 
public good, or a public good.  Under this categorization system, private water resources 
are those stored in man-made objects like private containers, private distribution systems, 
and reservoirs.  Sharia places very few limitations on the use, sale, trade, or donation of 
private goods.  Water resources, such as streams and lakes that are located on private 
land, are classified as restricted public goods.  Although Islamic law does not allow for 
ownership of these resources, it does grant special rights to the land-owner, including the 
ability to prevent others from using the resource for a purpose other than human and 
animal consumption.  The waters contained in natural reservoirs like rivers, lakes, 
aquifers, and the oceans are public goods.  The sale of public goods is forbidden unless 
individuals render the water a private good by adding value through treatment, 
transportation, or storage.35   
In addition to these cases that deal explicitly with water, Islamic jurisprudence 
also affects water indirectly through its treatment of property rights and land tenure.  
Wilkinson alludes to this tendency when he notes that “in the physical environment in 
which Islam developed its system of government, water management inevitably formed 
                                                
34 M. T. Kadouri et. al., “Water rights and Water Trade:  An Islamic Perspective,” Water Management in Islam, Faruqui, Biswas, and 
Bino Eds. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), 89. 
35 Ibid., 89-90. 
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an important sub-set of the laws and practices subsumed under ‘land management.’”36  
Shariah’s treatment of land ownership is important because it touches on issues like 
riparian rights, water ownership, and water use in the agricultural sector.   
For the purposes of this project, the concept of dead land is one of the most 
relevant aspects of land law that affects water use.  Shariah defines dead lands as 
uncultivated lands that lack an owner.  The cultivation of dead land is one means by 
which private ownership can be established.  In some schools of Islamic jurisprudence, 
this is the only way that ownership can be established over such lands.37  Since water is a 
prerequisite for bringing new land under cultivation, this system has the potential to 
provide encouragement for increased water use in the agricultural sector.  In a water 
scarce region, this increased demand for the already limited water resources may conflict 
with existing uses. 
 
ISLAMIC WATER MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 
Although many scholars have addressed the issue of water management,38 it is 
less common for researchers to address how established water management techniques 
should be adapted to account for differences in local culture and values.  As Amery notes, 
“The role that human cultural diversity plays in how water and other resources are 
perceived and consequently managed has been under-emphasized by researchers and 
practitioners.”39  In recent years, scholars, most notably Faruqi, have attempted to 
overcome this shortcoming by investigating the role played by religion in the effective 
management of water resources.  A number of international NGOs that work in the area 
                                                
36 Wilkinson, 55. 
37 Caponera, Water Laws in Moslem Countries, 35. 
38 Due to the large volume of literature that exists on this subject, it is impractical to provide a comprehensive listing of sources.  
39 Amery, 481. 
 14 
of water management – including the United Nations, World Bank, and Canadian 
International Development Agency – have attempted to account for variations in local 
culture and customs in development projects.40  Inquiries in this area appear to be 
particularly applicable to water management in the Muslim World where Islam, 
“regulates virtually all aspects of individual and collective human life, for example, 
issues such as buying and selling, contracts, inheritance, marriage, family and intimate 
relations, and even elemental issues such as eating and personal hygiene and 
sanitation.”41 
Although many academics have noted the theoretical consistencies between Islam 
and the responsible husbandry of water and other natural resources,42 a smaller group of 
academics has taken this one step further by arguing that there exists an unique style of 
water management that can be harmonized with Islam – creating a distinct brand of 
Islamic water management.43 Faruqi and his colleagues have attempted to demonstrate 
how Islam can complement or be harmonized with the various techniques that Western 
scholars have identified as potential mechanisms for improving the management of water 
resources.44  This research has the potential to address the acute water scarcity in the 
MENA region if it could be applied.  This is particularly true given the propensity for 
culturally appropriate water management techniques to improve the effectiveness of 
efforts to address water scarcity. 
The extent to which Islamic ideals are consistent with the modern water 
management techniques identified in the broader literature has been a source of 
disagreement.  For example, the shariah’s complicated treatment of water ownership 
                                                
40 Faruqui, “Introduction,” xiv –xv.  
41 Ibid., xv. 
42 For examples of this trend, see Abdel Haleem and Hamed. 
43 Faruqui, xv. 
44 Ibid. 
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rights would suggest that the religion prevents Muslim states from implementing 
techniques like wastewater reuse or the pricing systems that form the basis for water 
demand management. Nevertheless, scholars like Faruqui note that water management 
and Islamic shariah law are not mutually exclusive.45  Rather than precluding the 
implementation of these techniques, Muslim-majority states simply need to adapt the 
techniques to be consistent with the Islamic principles outlined above.  Furthermore, in 
many settings the environmental values that are advocated by the religion, such as 
humankind’s role of a steward of environmental resources, can reinforce efforts to 
implement water management techniques in the MENA region. 
The issue of whether modern water management techniques can be successfully 
extrapolated to Muslim states is connected to beliefs that the faith’s strict guidelines on 
sanitation and personal hygiene preclude the implementation of wastewater reuse. An 
example of this tendency is seen in Almas and Scholz argument that the reuse of 
wastewater effluent is socially unacceptable in Yemen because of Islam’s focus on 
cleanliness and purity.46  Despite this contention, wastewater reuse has been implemented 
effectively in Saudi Arabia.  As part of the government’s broader effort to address water 
scarcity, a lengthy study was undertaken to determine the extent to which wastewater 
reuse could be harmonized with Islam.  This process resulted in 1978 religious decree 
that endorsed the reuse of treated effluent in the agricultural sector.47  Similarly, a recent 
public opinion survey undertaken in the West Bank illustrates the broad public support 
that exists for wastewater reuse within Palestinian society.48 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
46 Ahmed Almas and Miklas Scholz, “Agriculture and Water Resources Crisis in Yemen: Need for Sustainable Agriculture,” Journal 
of Sustainable Agriculture 28, 3 (2006): 55. 
47 Walid A. Abderrahman, “Water Demand Management in Saudi Arabia,” Water Management in Islam,  Faruqui, Biswas, and Bino 
Eds. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), 74-75. 
48 Nader Al-Khateeb, “Sociocultural acceptability of wastewater reuse in Palestine,” Water Management in Islam,  Faruqui, Biswas, 
and Bino Eds. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), 79. 
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There also exists debate about whether key aspects of water demand management 
can be implemented in Muslim-majority states because of the complicated legal issues 
relating to the ownership and sale of water resources.  Webb and Iskandarani, for 
example, contend that, “there are religions (for example Islam) that prohibit water 
allocation by market forces.”49  Although Webb and Iskandarani are correct in alluding to 
the potential complications of market-based allocation of water resources in the Muslim 
World, Islam does not entirely preclude the implementation of water demand 
management principles.  Despite these complications, Khadouri et. al. note that Islam 
generally supports of markets so long as they ensure accessibility, fairness, and social 
justice.50  Islam technically allows for the sale of water and market-based approaches to 
water demand management have been successfully implemented in a number of Muslim 
states.  This is true in Saudi Arabia where the government implemented water tariffs in 
1994 to encourage the conservation of costly desalinated water.51  In Iran, the 
government has reconciled the need for market-based solutions with the right of thirst by 
providing citizens with a small amount of water free of charge and utilizing market prices 
for all additional water use.52  The ability for two theocracies in the MENA to reconcile 
water demand management with Islam suggests that Islam does not necessarily prevent 
market-based solutions to water management.   
Despite these areas of contention, Islam has the potential to contribute to and 
reinforce the vast majority of modern water management techniques discussed in the 
literature.   In his overview of the subject, Farouqui notes that Islam is consistent with 
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many water management techniques including: family planning, water conservation, and 
the reallocation of water use across sectors of the economy.53  Family planning has the 
potential to improve water scarcity in the region because high population growth rates 
reduce per capita endowments of water resources.  Despite the tendency for family 
planning to be controversial amongst some religious groups in the West, it is encouraged 
by the government in many states in the MENA region and has been endorsed by Muslim 
jurists.54  Nevertheless, high population growth rates remain an issue throughout much of 
the region.  Although, Islam’s role in legitimizing family planning practices has the 
potential to contribute to government-led attempts to manage water resources, the 
region’s demographic trends suggest that it alone is insufficient to fully address the 
problem. 
Conservation is one area where Islam has the potential to play a major supporting 
role given the faith’s role in the areas of education and cultural change.  A number of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to address water scarcity in the region 
have noted the benefit of incorporating religion into attempts to promote water 
conservation.  One study on the effectiveness of these campaigns notes that “it has been 
shown over the last 10 years that campaigning for the conservation of the environment 
within the Islamic faith is productive, and specifically that using the Islamic education 
system to address the public of the [Eastern Mediterranean Region] on important issues 
such as water conservation has beneficial effects in raising public awareness.”55  In 
addition to the role that the religion has played in NGO-sponsored conservation efforts, 
religion has played a role in state efforts to promote water conversation, even in relatively 
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secular states.  For example, Jordanian authorities have used Islamic communication 
channels and religious texts to support its efforts to promote water conservation 
nationwide.56  
In an unique application of shariah principles, Farouqui argues that Islam’s water 
use preferences – which gives priority to human and animal consumption – has the 
potential to improve the efficiency of water use by encouraging intersectoral shifts in the 
allocation of water resources because it has the potential to reduce water use in the 
agricultural sector.57  This prioritization of human and animal uses for water likely comes 
out of a nomadic culture that was not dependent on crop production.  In addition to being 
the largest use for water in virtually all states in the MENA, agricultural water use tends 
to be the least efficient in the sense that it provides the lowest economic return per unit of 
water used.  If combined with well functioning water markets, the right of thirst may be a 
viable mechanism for intersectoral reallocations of water resources.58  With no shariah 
protections for agricultural water use, it appears as if food production or a right of hunger 
is not necessarily protected.  This may be desirable in an era where food imports have the 
potential to expand the water supply through the importation of the virtual water implicit 
in their production.  This is yet another case where Islam creates a culturally-specific 
opportunity for improving water management. 
In addition to its potential to improve the domestic management of water 
resources, Islam also can play a role in the management of resources shared among states.  
This is particularly important given the high number of trans-boundary resources that 
exist within the region, including the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Mountain 
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Aquifer in Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel.  Mallat argues that international 
principles relating to the management of trans-boundary resources are largely consistent 
with those advocated by Islam.59  Despite the consistencies between shariah and 
international water law, further work is needed to develop an Islamic water management 
strategy for these resources.60  Unfortunately, like the work completed by the 
International Law Association on trans-boundary water management, Islamic principles 
which call for the responsible sharing of international waters have yet to have had a 
noticeable effect on the management of these resources, a topic discussed in chapter 3.61   
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Chapter 3: Management of Trans-Boundary Resources in the Nile and 
Tigris-Euphrates Basins 
It is often noted that the boarders of man-made nation states rarely correspond to 
the naturally-occurring boundaries of surface and groundwater basins.  Many of the 
earth’s freshwater resources are, therefore, trans-boundary – shared between two or more 
states.  It is estimated that over 40 percent of the world’s total population depends on 
these shared resources.62  Prominent examples of such resources include the Indus River 
and the Rio Grande - Rio Colorado river basin.  Trans-boundary water resources pose 
unique challenges for joint management.  Although international law has made progress 
in recent decades on mechanisms to promote the cooperative management of trans-
boundary resources, there exists no consistent framework that is universally accepted.  As 
a result, the management regime for a given river or aquifer tends to be based on bilateral 
or multilateral agreements among riparian states.  There exist more than 286 agreements 
of this type that govern the management of trans-boundary resources worldwide.63 
As noted above, trans-boundary water resources comprise a significant share of 
the total freshwater resources available to states in the MENA region.  The Nile, Jordan, 
and Tigris-Euphrates River Basins are examples of major river systems in the region that 
are not confined to the boarders of a single state.  In addition to these rivers, many of the 
region’s groundwater resources are also trans-boundary.  Naff and Dellapenna remark 
that, “although groundwater has increasingly become the focus of disputes between 
nations, a consistent body of state practice has yet to emerge.”64  Accordingly, this thesis 
focuses exclusively on the management of trans-boundary surface waters.  However, 
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future scholarship ought to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how trans-
boundary groundwater resources are managed in Muslim-majority states.   
The importance of trans-boundary water resources in the MENA combined with 
the region’s low per capita freshwater endowments have led many to predict that future 
conflicts in the region will be over water resources.  Most notably, the former UN 
Secretary General Buotros Buotros-Ghali, an Egyptian, warned that, “the next war in our 
region will be over the waters of the Nile.”65  This remark is reinforced by Egypt’s 
numerous statements about its willingness to employ its presumed military superiority 
over neighboring states to ensure continued access to Nile water.  In Egypt’s view, its 
historical role as the primary recipient of the Nile’s water justifies such a use of military 
power.66  The debate about whether water scarcity is likely to result in violent conflict 
continues in the academic literature.  A group known as the neo-Malthusians argues that 
violence is the inevitable result of water scarcity.67  Fortunately, as Naff and Matson note, 
“water as an impulsion towards conflict carries its own corollary, being as well an 
impetus toward cooperation.68  Regardless of whether water wars are in the in region’s 
future, it is clear that forces like climate change, population growth, and economic 
development create increased demands on existing resources and necessitate inter-
riparian cooperation.  In the context of Islamic water management, capitalizing on the 
religiously inspired value system established by Islam may encourage such cooperation 
in the MENA region.  
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Although the MENA is home to a number of trans-boundary water resources, this 
text focuses on cooperation in the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates River Basins.  Due to the 
extent to which the management of the Jordan River Basin is entangled in the ongoing 
peace process with Israel, this thesis will avoid discussion of this resource.  Nevertheless, 
Jordan’s domestic water management policies are a source of discussion in the next 
chapter of this thesis.  In both the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates Basins, downstream states 
like Egypt and Iraq have historically been the primary users of the resource.  In the 
modern era, this arrangement has begun to change as upstream states like Ethiopia and 
Turkey begin seeking a larger share of water resources to satisfy domestic needs as well 
as demand for increased agricultural production and hydroelectric power.  Increasing 
water demand by upstream users has required a reassessment of water use within the 
respective basins, the results of which are not yet apparent. 
The lack of a widely accepted legal framework for the cooperative management 
of trans-boundary water resources is a major hindrance to the effective management of 
international river basins.  Despite the large number of trans-boundary resources that 
exist worldwide, there are comparatively few international agreements that clearly 
delineate how such resources should be governed.  The situation is particularly 
troublesome in developing states, since the bulk of the agreements that do exist relate to 
shared water resources in Europe and North America.69  Nevertheless, there has been 
limited progress in developing a comprehensive international legal framework for the 
management of trans-boundary surface waters, most notably through the 1966 Helsinki 
Rules of the Uses of the Water of International Rivers and the closely-affiliated 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.70  
                                                
69 Naff and Dellapenna, 485. 
70 Dahilon Yassin Mohamoda, Nile Basin Cooperation: A Review of the Literature (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic Africa Institute, 2003), 
14. 
 23 
Although these documents are useful in analyzing relations among riparian states, their 
lack of widespread acceptance prevents their enforcement.  The lack of an enforcement 
mechanism is a major obstacle to cooperation and one that cannot be rectified without 
riparian states forgoing their claims to sovereignty over the shared resource.  According 
to Barandat and Kaplan, states will only surrender their sovereignty rights in exchange 
for tangible gains.71  It remains to be seen how such a scenario might play out in the Nile 
and Tigris-Euphrates River Basins. 
 
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 
Consistent with international law’s status as a decentralized system that lacks 
institutional structures for the enactment and enforcement of laws, the management of 
trans-boundary water resources is dependent largely on self-help, custom, and agreement.  
The primary mechanism for resolving conflicts between riparian states is custom.72  Since 
customary international law is derived from existing state practices that are “undertaken 
out of sense of legal obligation,” it can be based on treaties, international agreements, 
decisions of international assemblies, courts, and arbitrators, or unilateral actions.73  As 
noted above, the lack of a reliable enforcement mechanism is a major shortcoming of this 
system, limiting the ability for international law to address trans-boundary water 
management issues effectively.  
Participants in discussions about the apportionment and management of trans-
boundary freshwater resources may seek to argue for one of three primary positions 
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which may or may not be reflected in treaty language.  These include:  (1) absolute 
territorial sovereignty, (2) absolute integrity of the river, and (3) limited or restricted 
territorial sovereignty. Upstream nations are among the states that are most likely to 
argue for the position of absolute territorial sovereignty.  Under this principle, a state has 
an unmitigated right to utilize the resource in any way it sees fit.  Any criticisms of such 
practices by downstream states are viewed as interferences in the upper riparian’s 
domestic affairs.  This position is contrasted with that of absolute integrity of the river.  
More commonly employed by downstream states, this argument holds that lower riparian 
states can criticize or even punish their upstream neighbors for taking any action that 
negatively affects the water resource downstream.  Since these two positions can be 
mutually exclusive, a third argument, limited or restricted territorial sovereignty, calls for 
sovereignty limited by considerations for the interests of other riparian states.74  A less 
commonly cited fourth principle that has been referenced in the academic literature is that 
of community of interest, which holds that freshwater resources should be shared 
equitably amongst the community.75  
In recent years there has been an increasing tendency for the rights of riparian 
states to be codified in explicit bilateral and multilateral agreements.  Although such 
agreements are more common in Europe and North America, they do govern some 
resources in the MENA region, including the Nile.  As a result of Great Britain’s colonial 
presence in the region, the Nile River is subject to many such agreements, all of which 
were negotiated on a bilateral basis.76  An example of this type of agreement is the 1959 
Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and Sudan that establishes a quantitative 
distribution of the river’s annual flow.  In general, these agreements have favored the 
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principle of limited territorial sovereignty.  The application of the principle of restricted 
or limited sovereignty has extended beyond these agreements, however.  Dellapenna 
contends that, “restricted sovereignty, based on the concept that an international drainage 
basin is a coherent judicial and managerial unit, has become the customary rule of 
international law as shown by the many treaties based on the concept, international 
judicial and arbitral awards, and the near unanimous opinion of the most highly-qualified 
publicists.”77  Not surprisingly, this principle has also found its way into attempts by the 
United Nations (UN) to codify international laws governing shared freshwater resources. 
The most significant effort to codify international water law was undertaken by 
the United Nation’s International Law Commission (ILC) in 1966 and resulted in the 
creation of the Helsinki Rules of the Uses of the Water of International Rivers (from now 
on, the Helsinki Rules).  These rules have since been revised as the Berlin Rules of 2004. 
The Helsinki Rules, articulate that each state’s utilization of an international river basin 
or “hydrogeographic unit” be recorded, assessed, and evaluated.  This expectation, in 
addition to further legitimizing the principle of restricted sovereignty, gave explicit 
support to the “equitable apportionment and utilization-doctrine.”78  Despite an attempt 
by Finland to gain formal approval for the Helsinki Rules in the UN General Assembly, 
the measure was defeated on the grounds that the rules were developed by a professional 
organization rather than nation states.  These rules remain controversial amongst member 
states because they restrict sovereign action and are based on the notion that rivers should 
be approached as complex drainage basin systems rather than merely a channel through 
which water flows.79  Although the UN General Assembly did not adopt the Helsinki 
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Rules, the resulting resolution tasked the ILC with authoring a new document that 
addressed the concerns that prevented the formal codification of the rules.80 
Over the course of several decades, the ILC compiled a proposed text that would 
become the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (from now on, the Convention).  Throughout the negotiation process on the 
draft text, various states with equities in the management of trans-boundary rivers, 
including Turkey and Ethiopia, attempted to affect the final form of the Convention.81  
On May 21, 1997, the General Assembly formally adopted the convention.  Primary 
among the principles advanced by the document are those of “equitable and reasonable 
utilization” and “no significant harm.”82  These principles have since been employed by 
the states that are discussed in this paper.  In the case of downstream states, most notably 
Egypt and Sudan, the concept of historical use has been employed to emphasize the fact 
that increased upstream water use has the potential to cause harm to downstream riparian 
states.  Conversely, upper riparian states argue for a more equitable utilization of the 
water resource.83  However, the convention has not been ratified because few states have 
acceded to it. 
As noted above, it has been argued that there exist numerous consistencies 
between international principles guiding the management of trans-boundary water 
resources and Islamic jurisprudence.  Such a view is predicated on shariah’s similar 
dependence on customary law as well as its emphasis on the responsible stewardship of 
environmental resources.  Despite this theoretical consistency, none of the states involved 
in disputes over major river systems in the Middle East have invoked Islamic law in their 
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official legal claims.84 It, therefore, remains unclear what role shariah can or will play in 
the management on trans-boundary resources.  Nevertheless, the Islamic principles that 
dictate humankinds’ interaction with the environment continue to apply in the Muslim-
majority states that are referenced in this analysis. As the current international legal 
framework governing trans-boundary resources is admittedly weak, shariah has the 
potential to provide additional mechanisms for managing such resources.85 
 
THE NILE RIVER BASIN 
The Nile River, the world’s longest river, is located in the northeastern quadrant 
of the African continent.  The river’s basin encompasses nearly 2 million square miles 
(772,240 square kilometers) and is home to approximately 150 million people. The basin 
traverses through ten countries: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.  Contributions to the 
river’s flow vary considerably by country – with Ethiopia contributing the majority of the 
river’s water and Egypt, the primary user of the resource, contributing none.86  Although 
Egypt and Sudan are the only Muslim-majority riparian states, most are home to Muslim 
populations that comprise a significant percentage of each country’s total population.   
As with many international river systems, there exists considerable disagreement 
amongst riparian states about the proper allocation and utilization of the Nile’s water 
resources.  Unlike many other trans-boundary water resources in the developing world,  
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a number of international agreements between the riparian states dictate how water is 
allocated within the basin. Despite the existence of these agreements, riparian  
states are unable to reach a common understanding on their legitimacy.  Egypt and 
Sudan, which are granted the full use of the river’s water through the agreements, argue 
that the documents remain in effect.  Conversely, most other riparian states argue that the 
agreements are no longer applicable on the grounds that they were negotiated on their 
behalf and without their input during the colonial period. 
Great Britain’s desire to increase Egypt’s cotton production in the early part of the 
20th century resulted in policies that maximized Egypt’s share of Nile resources at the 
expense of upstream states.  Accordingly, it was the goal of the colonial administrators to 
maintain order in the upper riparian states while investing heavily in water development 
in Egypt and northern Sudan.87  This policy resulted in the formulation of multiple 
agreements between Egypt and its neighbors that were negotiated on their behalf by 
colonial administrators and provided Egypt with the majority of the basin’s water 
resources.  Despite an end to the colonial period in the Nile River Basin, these 
agreements continue to be a source of conflict.  So great was the United Kingdom’s 
impact on the development of the Nile River Basin that Tvedt advocates referring to the 
present era as the “post-colonial age.”88 
Although most international agreements that were brokered by colonial powers 
continue to affect the management of the Nile River Basin, the most commonly cited of 
these agreements are the 1902, 1929 and 1959 Nile River Agreements.  The 1902 
agreement was negotiated been the British and Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia.  Under 
the agreement, Ethiopia agreed that it would not undertake any works on the Nile without 
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the express consent of both Egypt and Sudan.89  In light of Ethiopia’s status as the 
primary contributor to the Nile’s flow as well as the country’s ongoing interest in 
expanding its hydroelectric generation capacity, this agreement has become particularly 
problematic for the Ethiopian Government.  Like other riparian states, Ethiopia has 
attempted to argue that the agreement is no longer applicable on the grounds that it was 
the product of the colonial legacy in Africa. 
As the primary recipients of the Nile’s waters, Egypt and Sudan were the focus of 
both the 1959 and 1929 agreements.  In the 1929 agreement, which was carried out 
through an exchange of diplomatic notes, the need for Sudan to develop irrigation was 
formally recognized.  However, the agreement stipulated that any development in Sudan 
could not infringe upon Egypt’s historic rights – which were noted to include the entire 
natural flow of the river from January to July.90  Thus, out of the river’s annual flow of 84 
cubic kilometers (km3), 48 km3 were allocated to Egypt with only 4 km3 going to 
Sudan.91  By the 1950s, this agreement was becoming unacceptable to Sudan.  In an 
effort to secure Sudan’s support for the construction of the Aswan High Dam, the 1959 
agreement was negotiated which significantly increased Sudan’s share of the Nile waters.  
The entire annual flow of the river was allocated under the agreement – with Egypt 
receiving 55.5 km3, Sudan receiving 18.5 km3, and an estimated 10 km3 lost through 
evaporation at Lake Nasser.92  This agreement has not been well received by other 
riparian states because it comes at the expense of other basin states.  According to 
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Waterbury, is is a common trend in bilateral agreements on water resources to come at 
the expense of third parties.93 
Since gaining independence, most of the upstream states have attempted to negate 
past international agreements governing the allocation of Nile waters – claiming that they 
were negotiated on their behalf by colonial powers and are therefore no longer binding.  
Ethiopia’s position on this point has been particularly important given the country’s 
desire to increase it’s utilization of the Nile for irrigation and hydroelectric purposes.  In 
Ethiopia’s renouncement of the 1902 Agreement, it cited similar behavior on the part of 
Egypt and Sudan in renouncing colonial-era treaties unrelated to water issues that were 
deemed inconsistent with state interests.94  Despite the appeal of this argument, the 
position is difficult to defend in the wake of the 1978 Vienna Convention, which clearly 
establishes the concept of the Succession of Treaties, which obligates successor states to 
adhere to past international agreements.95  Regardless of whether riparian states have the 
ability to abandon these agreements, they remain a source of contention among the Nile 
Basin countries.  In 2002, the issue of the 1929 agreement was raised in both the Kenyan 
and Ugandan parliaments, with members of parliament questioning the legality of the 
agreement and calling on their respective governments to denounce it.96 
Rather than promoting an equitable and sustainable distribution of Nile water 
resources, these contested agreements have inhibited cooperation among riparian states.  
The current set of agreements has given a clear advantage to the lower riparian states of 
Egypt and Sudan.  Although the current distribution of resources is admittedly 
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inequitable, any recognition of an upstream riparian’s right to additional water has the 
potential to undermine Egypt’s position of power.  Egypt’s apprehension to cede ground 
to upstream states can be seen in its opposition to small projects on the White Nile sub-
basin that would have little or no impact on its water supply.  As evidenced by this 
behavior, Egypt’s current position of power creates incentives for it to forgo cooperation 
with other basin states.  Dellapenna notes that, “to create the sort of regime necessary to 
allay conflict and optimize the use and preservation of the resource will require a new 
treaty, one that includes all basin communities, creates appropriate representative basin-
wide institutions, and has the clout to enforce its mandates.”97 
Despite the fact that Ethiopia contributes approximately 86 percent of the total 
flow of the Nile, it is severely limited in its ability to harness these resources to better the 
lives of its citizens.  This fact is reflected in the widely publicized poverty and hunger 
that have plagued the country in recent decades.  Although Ethiopia has between 3.6 and 
5.7 million hectares (ha) of potentially irrigable land, only 30,000 ha are presently under 
irrigation.  Similarly, while 58 percent of the basin’s hydroelectric potential occurs within 
its borders, Ethiopia has harnessed a mere 2 percent of this value.98  While it is clear that 
Ethiopia can benefit from an increased share of the Nile’s resources, Egypt’s historical 
use of the resource, as codified in the various international agreements, limits the 
realization of these benefits.  This has put Ethiopia on a collision course with the 
hydrological interests of its downstream neighbors.   
As an upstream riparian state, Ethiopia advocates for the concept of absolute 
territorial sovereignty in international negotiations.  In an attempt to make use of the vast 
quantities of water that flow through its boundaries, Ethiopia has argued that former 
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agreements governing the resource are invalid and need to be renegotiated to provide the 
country with a greater share of the Nile’s water.  Such a position is consistent with the 
view of most Ethiopians.  One scholar notes how, in contrast to past generations of 
Ethiopians that viewed the Nile as a symbol of national pride, the current framework for 
sharing the Nile has incited the resentment of many younger Ethiopians who have 
suffered under drought and famine – while Egypt and Sudan monopolized the water of 
Ethiopia’s Blue Nile.99  Since the 1980s, the subject has been a irritant in the bilateral 
relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia.  In addition to making legal arguments for why 
past agreements should be considered null, Ethiopia has labeled ongoing and planned 
water projects in Egypt and Sudan as wasteful, noting that water storage in the Ethiopian 
plateau has the potential to be much more efficient given the country’s more moderate 
climate.100  
Ethiopia continues to advocate for an increased share of the Nile’s water and has 
made a number of proposals for utilizing the river to increase the country’s share of 
irrigated land and hydroelectric generation capacity.  Although these demands are 
predicated on the hydrological realities of the Nile Basin, Ethiopia’s demand for 
hydroelectric power is equally connected to the remnants of Cold War politics.  In the 
wake of Egypt’s decision to employ Soviet financing and technical assistance in the 
construction of the Aswan Dam, the United States undertook a survey of the Blue Nile 
sub-basin in 1957 with an eye towards maximizing its irrigation and hydropower 
potential.  As noted by Waterbury, the more than twenty major projects identified by the 
study were, “a clear shot across the bows of Egypt and the USSR; Egypt may have its 
Soviet-financed dam, but Ethiopia has Egypt’s water.”101  This issue continues to be a 
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source of conflict for the two nations.  Ethiopia’s announcement in the late 1990s of its 
intent to construct a network of “micro-dams” for hydroelectric generation and irrigation 
was met with strong condemnation from the Egyptian government.102  Unfortunately for 
Egypt, it has been forced to contend with similar developments from the other riparian 
states that comprise the White Nile sub-basin. 
Although Ethiopia, by nature of the large percentage of total Nile waters that 
originate within its borders, is the most vocal of the upstream states, the countries in the 
White Nile sub-basin share Ethiopia’s desire to challenge the downstream states’ 
domination of the resource.  Of these states, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have the 
greatest interest in the outcomes of any decisions related to the allocation of water 
resources because they border the sub-basin’s primary bodies of water.  Similar to the 
course of action advocated by Ethiopia in the Blue Nile sub-basin, these states have 
begun to request increased rights to the sub-basin’s resources and permission to build the 
infrastructure needed for expanded irrigation and hydroelectric power projects. 
Although the states of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda 
have a clear interest in how the Nile is managed, their roles are more limited than those of 
the co-riparian states mentioned above.  Nevertheless, they collectively contribute 13 
billion cubic meters to Lake Victoria each year.103  From the perspective of the Nile’s 
downstream users the relative importance of the upper riparian states may not be all that 
important.  In recent years, a proposal by Tanzania to divert water from Lake Victoria for 
use in the interior of the country has been met with stiff resistance from the Egyptian 
Government.  Although the project, which Tanzinia is committed to pursuing unilaterally, 
will have little to no impact on users downstream, it creates a precedent for expanded 
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upstream development.104  From the perspective of downstream users like Egypt and 
Sudan, which purport to be entitled to the entire annual flow of the Nile, any such 
development has the potential to upset their monopoly over the river’s resources. 
As the primary historical user of the Nile, a role codified in the existing 
international agreements governing the allocation of water resources in the basin, Egypt 
has reason to be concerned about attempts by upper riparians to alter the status quo.  
Although this thesis does not attempt to make a normative judgment about whether the 
river’s resources should be more equitably divided amongst co-riparian states, it is 
important to note that the river is critical to Egypt’s national security as it is the country’s 
only source of freshwater and the primary input to the country’s agricultural sector which 
sustains nearly a third of its total population.105  Despite these concerns, Yohannes 
identifies a number of factors that increase the likelihood that Egypt will take a more 
cooperative stance in the future.  Among these factors are the potential for future Nile 
flows to fluctuate in terms of their quantity and quality and the fact that upstream users 
are unlikely to abandon their efforts to increase their utilization of the Nile waters.106  For 
the time being, however, Egypt appears undeterred in its attempts to continue to 
monopolize the resource. 
Rather than looking for opportunities to share the rivers waters with co-riparians, 
the domestic policies that Egypt has outlined in recent years with respect to its water 
resources indicates that it anticipates sustained or increased demand for freshwater 
resources.  These plans include a state-led effort to bring large tracks of desert land under 
cultivation.  Egypt’s desert reclamation projects aim to develop agricultural lands in the 
country’s Western Oasis and northern Sinai regions.  The large quantities of water needed 
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to sustain the projects are contributing to water scarcity in Egypt.  According to official 
government estimates, population growth and increased water demand from agriculture 
will result in an annual demand of 86.75 billion cubic meters (bcm) by 2017, 
considerably higher than the state’s annual 55.5 bcm share of Nile waters.107  Thus, even 
if Egypt is able to maintain its share of the Nile’s annual flow, freshwater from the Nile 
would be insufficient to meet growing water demand.  Presumably, this will deter Egypt 
from earnestly pursuing cooperation in the region, which is likely to limit upstream 
countries’ access to the river’s water resources. 
Given Egypt’s interest in maintaining it’s current monopoly over the Nile’s 
waters, the state has employed a number of strategies in its interactions with other 
riparian states.  These tactics have included:  reminding other basin states of its 
willingness to employ military power in efforts to guarantee access to its historical 
endowment of Nile waters; advancing legal arguments that justify the current 
apportionment of resources; and employing tactics geared at denying upstream states 
access to financial and technical assistance for water development projects.108  Although 
these tactics have been largely successful to date, it remains unclear how long they can be 
effective in limiting upstream development. 
As a fellow downstream state, Sudan’s position on Nile Basin cooperation is most 
closely aligned with that of Egypt.  Like Egypt, Sudan benefits from the codification of 
its water rights and has an interest in ensuring that past agreements are recognized by 
other riparian states.  Nevertheless, the country’s fast growing population and increasing 
demand for irrigated land has resulted in Sudanese claims of “shortages in the midst of 
plenty.”109 Although Sudan would prefer a larger share of the river’s waters than what it 
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is afforded under the 1959 agreement, Sudan is forced to tread carefully on the subject of 
Nile cooperation.  This, among other factors, has complicated its bilateral relationship 
with Egypt. 
Although Sudan is Egypt’s strongest ally among the states in the Nile Basin – a 
result of their shared interests as downstream states – cooperation between the two 
countries is rarely straightforward.  Sudan’s interest in exploiting increasing amounts of 
Nile water for irrigation purposes is not consistent with Egypt’s attempt to maintain the 
status quo.  Due to the economic crisis and civil wars that have plagued Sudan in recent 
years, however, the Khartoum government has been unable to pursue such a course of 
action.110  In addition to the hydrological debates, the bilateral relationship has been 
strained on the political front as well.  In the mid-1990s, Sudan’s alleged support for 
Islamist groups in Egypt became a source of conflict between the two nations.111  Though 
not directly related to the subject of Islamic water management, Sudan’s support for 
Islamist group in Egypt may suggest that religious considerations factor into its foreign 
policy decisions.  While tensions between Egypt and Sudan have since improved, the 
potential succession of Southern Sudan may further complicate relations in the Nile 
Basin.112 
The current situation in the Nile River Basin is unsustainable and, by nature of the 
fundamental inequality that exists in the distribution of water resources, inconsistent with 
some of the international legal principles that have been identified by the ILC, such as 
equitable utilization.  On the other hand, modifying the status quo would be inconsistent 
with other ILC principles, including historical use.  Although all riparian states have 
recognized the need for cooperation in the management and development of the basin, 
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water resource actions by the basin’s inhabitants on occasion still dissolve into unilateral 
action.113  Given the disparate positions held by the upper and lower riparian states, this 
seems unlikely to change in the near future.  As Durth notes, “despite large potential 
efficiency gains, there will be no cooperation if upstream and downstream states have 
radically different ideals about the fair usage or division of international resources.”114  
This observation has negative implications for the prospects for future intra-basin 
cooperation. 
Despite the disparate positions taken by basin states, the post-colonial era has 
witnessed a number of attempts to promote basin-wide cooperation.  The first attempt 
that expanded cooperation beyond bilateral institutions was the creation of HYDROMET 
in the 1960s to address flooding in the basin.  The project, which lasted for 25 years, 
focused on the collection and sharing of hydro-meteorological data on the basin.  As the 
project concluded in 1992, it was replaced with an similar initiative known as 
TECCONILE.  Notable in the creation of TECCONILE is the fact that all basin countries 
were represented either as members or observers. This contrasts with earlier 
organizations like Undugu, a joint Egyptian and Sudanese undertaking to promote inter-
basin cooperation in the 1980s, which lacked full representation from Nile Basin 
countries.115  Although the development of these organizations gives some hope for 
potential cooperation, they have yet to yield tangible results. 
The current mechanism that is being promoted as the key to inter-riparian 
cooperation is the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).  The successor to TECCONILE, the 
organization was established in 1999 and has full representation from all Nile Basin 
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countries.  The body is tasked with encouraging information sharing amongst member 
states, promoting technical cooperation, and undertaking joint development projects.116  
Although the initiative is meant to be a temporary mechanism to promote cooperation in 
the absence of a formal legal framework, there is hope that the NBI will form the basis 
for a lasting solution to the issues currently facing the basin and a model for the 
management of other trans-boundary water resources.  The ultimate aim of the NBI is the 
creation of a new treaty that would be used for the management and development of the 
basin.117 
The introduction of the NBI has been well received in academic circles, with 
scholars noting that a “spirit” of cooperation among Nile Basin states is a largely new 
development.  To this group, the NBI represents a new framework that has the potential 
to result in the peaceful resolution of conflicts related to the apportionment of the Nile’s 
resources.118  As Brunné and Toope note, the results of this new initiative remain to be 
seen.  Nevertheless, the initiative appears to be making progress on securing buy-in from 
the various stakeholders and articulating principles for adjudicating joint development 
projects.119  Unfortunately, last year’s meeting of NBI member states in Egypt found 
renewed attempts by the host country to assert its historical claims to the Nile’s entire 
annual flow.  As a result, great uncertainty surrounds the future of the NBI and its efforts 
to establish a new international legal framework for the Nile River Basin. 
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THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES RIVER BASIN 
In contrast to the Nile River Basin, which encompasses ten African states, the 
Tigris-Euphrates Basin is shared by just three Middle Eastern states, each of which is a 
Muslim-majority nation:  Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.  Similar to the Nile, however, the 
Tigris-Euphrates Basin has an established usage pattern for its water resources that 
developed over millennia and favors the downstream user, Iraq.  Both rivers were home 
to some of the world’s most advanced civilizations, which flourished as a result of their 
ability to harness water resources from the rivers.  Despite Iraq’s role as this historical 
recipient of the Tigris-Euphrates waters, the development of water resources by the 
upstream nations of Turkey and Syria have in recent decades resulted in conflicts over the 
allocation of water resources. 
 
Illustration 2: Map of Tigris-Euphrates River Basin.  
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Located north of the Arabian Peninsula, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are 
primary sources of freshwater for the riparian states.  Although water discharge from the 
river varies considerably by year and season, experts estimate the basin’s annual flow is 
between 68 billion cubic meters (bcm) and 84.5 bcm.120  The basin covers a total area of 
831,600 km2, with the break down by riparian state as follows: 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Tigris-Euphrates River Basin Area by State  
(km2) 
 Turkey Syria Iraq Total 
Euphrates 146,520 33.0% 84,360 19.0% 240,240 46.0% 444,000 
Tigris 57,600 14.9% 1,000 0.3% 292,000 75.3% 387,600 
Total 204,120 23.0% 85,360 9.0% 456,240 60.5% 831,600 
Source:  Kibaroglu, 167. 
 
Despite the relatively small portion of the total basin area that lies in Turkey, as the 
upstream riparian for both rivers, it contributes a disproportionate amount to the river 
system’s total discharge.  Based on data presented by Kibaroulu, it is possible to calculate 
the contributions of riparian states as follows:   
 
Table 3: Contribution to Tigris-Euphrates River Discharge by State 
(bcm/year) 
 Turkey Syria Iraq Total 
Euphrates 28.922 90.0% 3.213 10.0% 0.000 0.0% 32.135 
Tigris 20.840 44.0% 0.000 0.0% 26.571 56.0% 47.411 
Total 49.762 62.5% 3.213 4.0% 26.571 53.6% 79.564 
Adapted from:  Kibaroglu, 166-167.  Author’s calculations. 
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The information that is presented in the table above illustrates the extent to which the 
downstream riparians in the basin, Syria and Iraq, benefit from the large share of water 
that Turkey contributes to the watercourse.  Despite the large quantity of water carried by 
the system, it is estimated that demand for water resources in the basin will significantly 
outstrip supply by the year 2040.  This is particularly true for the Euphrates River, for 
which Kibaroglu predicts that demand will exceed supply by some 20.1 bcm per year.121  
This disparity highlights the need for future cooperation amongst basin countries in order 
to ensure the proper management of the resource. 
As noted above, Iraq has historically been the primary beneficiary of the annual 
flows of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.  The indication of the value of these flows is 
evidenced in the number of laws related to water resources contained in the Hammurabi 
Code.122  Although upper riparian states in the basin have begun to increase their off-take 
of water resources, Iraq remains that largest user of the basin’s waters.  Even as recently 
as 1997, upwards of 1.29 million hectares (ha) were irrigated from waters from the 
Euphrates.  This contrasts sharply with the totals in Turkey and Syria, at 140,000 and 
274,000 ha, respectively.123  Plans to increase water use in upstream states, however, 
threaten Iraq’s ability to use its historical share of the basin’s resources. 
Turkey’s ongoing project to develop irrigation and hydroelectric infrastructure in 
the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin is the primary source of this increased water demand.  
The Turkish Southeastern Anatolian Project, known as the GAP, is the Turkish 
Government’s attempt to promote economic development in rural Turkey by investing in 
the development of water resources at the headwaters of the basin.  Through the GAP 
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project, Turkey intends to generate enough hydroelectric power to satisfy 25 percent of 
the country’s electricity demand and bring upwards of 1.7 million ha under cultivation in 
the southeastern corner of the country.124 Despite the GAP’s obvious benefits for Turkey 
and its citizens, the project has resulted in conflict between Turkey and other riparian 
states because of the dramatic effect it is having on the water resources in the basin. 
In contrast to the current levels of distrust that exist between riparian states, 
scholars like Kibaroglu note that prior to the 1960s relations among basin states were 
strong.  This good will could have reflected the minimal development of the upstream 
basins, which enabled cooperation because demand for water did not exceed supply.  
This relationship, however, changed as states began to undertake development projects 
within the basin.125  Although there is a tendency to place blame on Turkey for this shift, 
development has not been limited to the GAP project.  During this same period, both 
Syria and Iraq undertook projects of their own aimed at further exploiting the waters of 
the Tigris-Euphrates.  This is particularly true in the case of Syria, where a number of 
projects were undertaken to increase the amount of irrigated land.126 The result of this 
extensive development in the basin was a series of talks between the riparian states. 
Between 1962 and 1998, the basin states participated in at least 16 rounds of 
multi-party discussions to promote cooperation on the management of the basin. Even 
simple agreements on maters like information sharing proved to be impossible to achieve 
during these forums.127  In the absence of written agreements, like the ones that at least 
hypothetically govern water allocation in the Nile River Basin, the participants have been 
unable to reach a consensus on the distribution of water resources in the basin.  In 
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addition to states using the discussions to serve their own interests, Durth points to a 
number of political issues such as Syria’s interactions with Kurdish separatist groups, the 
Gulf War, and other political obstacles that have impeded progress.128  The current U.S.-
led military conflict in Iraq has also done little to enable cooperation among the riparians 
on water issues in recent years.   
In discussions on the status of the basin’s water resources, the riparian states often 
adhere to predictable positions in their negotiations.  Iraq and Syria, by nature of their 
status as downstream riparians, argue the doctrine of absolute integrity of the river to 
leverage their historical use of the resource.  Conversely, Turkish negotiators tend to 
adhere to the position of absolute territorial sovereignty – claiming that ownership of the 
resource allows them to use the Euphrates as they see fit.129  The resulting conflict has 
limited the riparian states’ abilities to manage the resource.  Although cooperation in the 
Nile River Basin has certainly been less-than-ideal, some progress has been made.  By 
contrast, the riparian states of the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin have made comparatively 
little progress on the joint management of the resource.  The majority of the cooperation 
thus far has been confined to discussions among the riparians. 
The limited cooperation in the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin is interesting because 
it is not subject to the same complexities found in the Nile River Basin.  In addition to 
involving significantly fewer states, the riparian states of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin are 
connected by a shared history as a result of their inclusion in the Ottoman Empire as well 
as a common Islamic religious identity.  Although these two case studies do not comprise 
a representative sample of trans-boundary water resources involving Muslim-majority 
states, the outcomes in the two basins are surprising.  In the case of the Tigris-Euphrates 
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Basin, the presence of exclusively Muslim-majority states does not appear to make 
cooperation more likely.  In fact, the outcome may provide empirical evidence for the 
opposite finding.  Nevertheless, it is apparent that the current system of international law 
that attempts to address trans-boundary issues provides an unsatisfactory framework for 
the management of both basins.  In discussing the relationship between secular and 
Islamic legal principles for the management of trans-boundary resources, Mallat 
advocates for regional frameworks that would augment the current system by applying 
Islamic legal principles.  The ineffectiveness of the current arrangement suggests that this 
proposal should be explored in greater detail in future scholarship on the subject.130 
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Chapter 4:  Domestic Water Management Techniques:  The Cases of 
Yemen and Jordan 
Although many states have a need to employ the techniques outlined in the 
previous chapter to ensure their access to adequate amounts of water resources, the bulk 
of water management actually takes place at the domestic level.  By reducing the demand 
for water within one’s own borders, a state may be better able to cope with the forces of 
water scarcity.  Fortunately, domestic management of water resources is a considerably 
easier undertaking than what has previously been presented.  In contrast to the crude 
policy tools available for the management of trans-boundary resources, a greater number 
of effective techniques and mechanisms have been developed to address the management 
of water resources within a given country.  While these techniques are most often applied 
in secular settings, chapter one highlights the fact that the majority of these techniques 
are consistent with and can be framed within an Islamic context. 
As a result of widespread water scarcity in the region, domestic water 
management is a particularly important topic for states located in the MENA region.  
Compounding the natural water scarcity that exists in the region are a variety of forces 
common throughout the MENA that further limit per capita water resources.  Among 
these forces are region’s fast population growth rate, rising living standards, the 
degradation of water resources, and changing weather patterns.  As a result of these 
forces, many nations face unique challenges in their attempts to effectively manage their 
water resource endowments.  By reconciling existing water management techniques with 
the Islamic alternatives presented above in this paper, states will likely be better equipped 
to deal with these challenges.  
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In an effort to better understand how shariah law currently affects the region’s 
water supply, this chapter presents brief case studies on the water management 
techniques employed in Yemen and Jordan.  Although both states face acute water 
scarcity, their respective strategies for the management of water resources are dictated by 
such factors as urbanization, primary water sources, and the efficiency of the central 
government – all of which are state-specific.  Although the case studies are not 
comprehensive in their analysis of the water management techniques employed in each 
state, they provide some insight in the potential the pros and cons of relying on water 
management techniques that are rooted in shariah law. 
 
WATER RESOURCES IN YEMEN 
When its annual share of renewable water resources are apportioned on a per 
capita basis, residents of Yemen have access to just 95 m3 of water per year.  This figure, 
which is considerably less than the MENA regional average of 1,250 m3 per year, renders 
Yemen one of the most water scarce states in a region that is know for its lack of 
freshwater resources.131  Given Yemen’s fast rate of population growth, its per capita 
share of water resources will continue to shrink in the coming years.  The country’s acute 
water scarcity provides the central government with justification to implement a 
comprehensive strategy for the management of its water resources.  Such a strategy could 
employ water demand management to limit consumption of the resource while 
simultaneously expanding the water supply through techniques like waste water reuse.  
Unfortunately, the latter aspect does not appear to be a viable option in Yemen as a result 
                                                




     Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book 
of localized religious opposition to waste water reuse which, as noted in chapter 1, is not 
consistent with state practice in Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
Illustration 3: Map of Yemen. 
Rather than limiting water demand to bring it in line with the state’s resource 
endowment, Yemen has engaged in a consumption pattern that has resulted in the 
overexploitation of the country’s water supply in recent decades.  Although this behavior 
has prevented the central government from implementing the politically unpopular 
policies that are needed to manage water demand, the overexploitation of water resources 
has been the cause of numerous environmental ills.  Throughout the country, aquifers are 
being drawn down at a rate theat exceeds their natural recharge.  In some of the most 
overexploited basins, the water table is falling by as much as 6 meters per year.132  Over-
pumping has subjected the country’s costal aquifers to increasing levels of salinity as 
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seawater begins in infiltrate the aquifer.  International experts have predicted that Sana’a 
will become the first of the world’s capital cities to become unable to supply adequate 
water resources to support its population.133 
Unlike most other countries, Yemen’s primary source of water resources is the 
country’s extensive network of aquifers.  Although surface water exists in limited 
quantities, its presence is subject to seasonal variations.  Groundwater, therefore, serves 
as the country’s only reliable source of water.  Since the introduction of groundwater 
lifting technologies in the 1970s, Yemen has experienced extensive groundwater 
development.  The introduction of these technologies has allowed the country to cope 
with water scarcity by drawing down groundwater resources at a rate that exceeds the 
natural rate of recharge.  In addition to the tendency for this overexploitation to degrade 
the resource, the lack of wastewater treatment facilities in most parts of the country 
further risks damage to the aquifers through wastewater recharge from anthropogenic 
wastes stored in unlined cesspools.134 
As in other regional states, high rates of population growth and rising living 
standards are increasing overall demand for water.  Given that Yemen’s population is 
largely rural and dependent upon agriculture, it should not be surprising that the bulk of 
the country’s water use is devoted to agriculture.135  The amount of water use in 
agriculture has increased in absolute terms as a result of the introduction of groundwater 
lifting technologies.  For example, in the Sa’ada basin over 2,500 wells extract water at a 
rate that exceeds natural recharge.  The vast majority of these wells are used for 
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irrigation.136  The increased water made available through the large-scale exploitation of 
groundwater resources has resulted in altered cropping patterns which prioritize water-
intensive cash crops like the narcotic qat, the production of which represents one of the 
most efficient allocations of water resources within Yemen’s agricultural sector, as 
measured by economic return on water use.137   
Although Yemen’s central government pays lip service to the importance of 
effective water management, it has failed to implement policies that have reduced water 
demand.  This lack of progress on water issues could be related to the state’s disinterest 
in the subject or it could reflect the Sana’a limited control over territories outside the 
capital.  Indeed, the central government has actually created incentives for expanding 
rather than limiting water use through a variety of flawed policies like state subsidies on 
the fuel used to run groundwater pumps and import tariffs designed promote domestic 
self sufficiency in the production of water-intensive citrus crops.138  Given the dearth of 
rational water conservation politics, it is hard to see how Yemeni water management is 
related to the tenants of Islamic shariah law. 
Despite Yemen’s flawed approach to water management, shariah has had a 
surprising impact on the country’s water supply.  In the absence of a state-led 
management regime, shariah’s position on the reclamation of dead land has encouraged 
Yemenis to expand the area under cultivation in order to gain ownership of the land.  
Lichtenthäler documents this tendency and notes that a combination of state policy 
encouraging domestic food self sufficiency and the notion of reclaiming dead lands 
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resulted in a considerable uptick in land reclamation attempts near Sa’ada during the 
1980s.139  Such an occurrence was made possible by groundwater lifting technologies 
that were increasing in popularity during this same period.  This situation suggests that, in 
the absence of state policy related to the management of water resources, applications of 
shariah have the potential to result in behaviors that are not consistent with Best water 
management practices.  
 
WATER RESOURCES IN JORDAN 
Jordan’s per capita endowment of renewable water resources amounts to 
approximately 120 m3/p/y, a volume similar to the magnitude of water scarcity in 
Yemen.140  Although the country is considerably wealthier than Yemen, it lacks the large 
oil endowments of neighboring states.  This prevents Jordan from artificially increasing 
its supply of freshwater through desalinization like its Gulf neighbors.  In the absence of 
a mechanism for increasing supply, water management techniques are an important part 
of Jordan’s attempts to address the issue of water scarcity.  By contrast, Jordan has been 
more effective than Yemen in employing such techniques. 
Residents of Jordan rely on a combination of surface and groundwater resources 
to satisfy their demand for water.  The country contains a number of river basins, 
including the trans-boundary Jordan River Basin that is shared between Syria, Lebanon, 
Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.  As a result of the country’s limited water 
resources, there has been an increasing emphasis placed on exploiting groundwater in 
recent decades.  Although this has helped to augment the water supply, Jordan’s capital 
has nevertheless faced considerable challenges in providing adequate water resources to 
                                                
139 Ibid. 
140 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, AQUASTAT, online database, at http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/ 
 52 
 
     Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book 
sustain the city’s population.  Often the city is only able to provide users of the municipal 
water system with service one day per week.141  This has resulted in an increasing 
dependence on private water delivery services that truck water to residents who are 
willing to pay a premium for its use. 
 
 
Illustration 4: Map of Jordan. 
Although the water situation is already a challenge for the Jordanians, it is 
predicted that increasing future demand will exacerbate the problem.  In addition the high 
population growth rates which are found throughout the MENA region (despite state-led 
attempts to limit the per capita births), the influx of refugees in recent years from 
neighboring Iraq only compounds this water scarcity.  According to Kuffer, Jordan’s 
government has also contributed to high demand though its efforts to promote an 
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expansion of irrigated lands in the country.142  In light of Jordan’s scarcity of freshwater 
resources, the country should be pursuing the opposite strategy.  By shifting the 
allocation of water resources away from the agricultural sector, a move justified under 
sharia’s preference for human uses for water, the Jordanian Government would be acting 
in a manner consistent with its need to improve the management of its water resources. 
In recent years, Jordan has been proactive in its efforts to implement water 
management best practices.  For example, the state has undertaken the difficult role of 
regulating groundwater extraction in an effort to improve the management of the 
resource.  Jordan’s progress on this front demonstrates the government’s willingness to 
adopt much-needed policies that are likely to be unpopular with the citizenry.  In addition 
the regulation of water use, the state has attempted to promote conservation by educating 
its citizens.  As in other Muslim-majority states, the Jordanians have attempted to frame 
these messages by delivering them in an Islamic religious context.  The state’s decision to 
utilize religion for this purpose has undoubtedly increased the effectiveness of the 
campaign.143  The Jordanian Government has been proactive in implementing an national 
water strategy that has helped promote water conservation and worked to invested in 
infrastructure projects aimed at augmenting the country’s water supply.  Although there 
is still room for improvement, the progress that Jordan has made in the area of water 
management are an impressive, particularly when compared to the lack of progress being 
made in other water scarce states like Yemen.   
Unlike the negative impact that the application of sharia has had on Yemen’s 
water resources, Jordan’s decision to integrate religious teachings into public awareness 
                                                
142 Ulrich Kuffner, “Contested Waters: Dividing or Sharing?” Water in the Middle East: Legal, Political, and Commercial 
Implications, Allan and Mallat Eds. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 83. 
143 Francesca Gilli, “Islam, Water Conservation, and Public Awareness Campaigns,” Presented at the 2nd Israeli – Palestinian – 
International Conference: Water for Life in the Middle East (October 10-14, 2004), 12. 
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campaigns on water scarcity have improved the management of the resource.  Although 
this is just one example of how the Jordanian Government has attempted to reconcile 
modern water management techniques with Islam, it nevertheless demonstrates the 
benefits of doing so.  As the country continues to grapple with water scarcity, it may 
undertake additional measures to improve its management of the resource.  The state 
should continue to explore new ways to integrate modern water management techniques 
with Islam in an effort to improve the effectiveness of its water management regime. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate the extent to which it is possible for 
states in the MENA region to utilize the principles of shariah law to improve their 
management of scarce water resources.  Despite the consistency between Islamic water 
law and the water management techniques advocated in contemporary academic literature 
on the subject, the concept of Islamic water management remains an underdeveloped area 
of study.  Although this thesis project has attempted to explore the extent to which 
Islamic water management techniques are or can been implemented in the region, 
additional work is needed in order to realize a comprehensive treatment of the subject.  In 
light of the widespread water scarcity that exists in Muslim-majority states, particularly 
those in the MENA region, such an undertaking is both necessary and worthwhile.  
From the material presented in chapter three of this document, it is apparent that 
secular law has proven ineffective in regulating the interactions between the riparian 
states of trans-boundary river basins.  Although the precise role that Islamic law can play 
in perfecting the existing system is unclear, Mallat’s advocacy for regional frameworks 
based on religious foundations seems like a good starting point for future analysis.  While 
it remains to be seen whether such frameworks would enhance the existing international 
system for the management of international rivers, any refinement of the secular system 
that increases the potential for a cooperative outcome would be a welcome development.  
Admittedly it is unlikely that shariah will become the basis for future agreements 
between riparian states, even those that hold Islam in common.  Nevertheless, the extent 
to which Islamic law informs modern jurisprudence in the MENA region as well as its 
explicit focus on water issues renders it a subject worthy of continued study.   
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The case studies of the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates River Basins do provide some 
preliminary insights into the cooperative management of trans-boundary resources 
amongst Muslim-majority states.  While the findings of this thesis do not necessarily 
have applicability beyond the two river basins analyzed, there is an implication that a 
state’s religious make-up does not fundamentally alter whether it is willing to cooperate 
with other riparian states.  Cooperation does not appear to be easier among states with 
similar religious views. The theoretical treatment of the Islamic principles governing 
water resources would lead to an expectation that Muslim countries are obliged to 
subscribe to certain views.  In practice, however, Muslim-majority states do not appear to 
be any more likely to have positions informed by these religious ideals.  Rather, a state’s 
position is most easily predicted based on its status as either an upstream and downstream 
riparian.  In can be inferred from this observation that the positions taken by each state 
are likely a reflection of that state’s own interests. 
In contrast to what seems to be a limited role for shariah at the international level, 
Islamic principles appear more suited for informing the management of water resources 
within a community.  This suggestion is reinforced by the numerous consistencies that 
scholars have identified between modern water management techniques and shariah law.  
Given the potential for locally sensitive adaptations of water management techniques to 
increase their effectiveness, it is not surprising that a number of regional states have 
attempted to harmonize internationally accepted techniques for the management of 
freshwater resources with the prescriptions outlined by Islamic law.  Although this has 
likely worked to Jordan’s advantage in its efforts to promote water conservation, in the 
absence of state oversight in Yemen, shariah has resulted in an undesirable expansion in 
the amount of land under cultivation and, therein, demand for water resources.  It is not 
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clear whether this is an isolated case or a common shortcoming with respect to Islamic 
law’s ability to promote the responsible utilization of water resources. 
Along these lines, the two domestic case studies presented in chapter four on this 
highlight important differences in the effects that shariah has on water resources.  The 
different outcomes that were experienced in the two states raise a number of questions 
about the causes of such divergent outcomes.  Was Yemen more likely to be negatively 
affected as a result of its weak state institutions?  What about the differing patterns of 
development between the two states?  Is dependence on groundwater more likely to result 
in a particular outcome?  While these are questions that may help to explain the different 
outcomes from shariah in Jordan versus Yemen, additional inquiry is needed to resolve 
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